Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

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Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

You are here:

Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

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Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation

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Reference: FINTRAC-2021-OA001July 2021
Updated Indicators: Laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation (PDF version, 671 KB)
Purpose
This Operational Alert updates FINTRAC’s 2016 Operational Alert “Indicators: The laundering of illicit proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation” with additional indicators in support of Project Protect to assist reporting entities in recognizing financial transactions suspected of being related to the laundering of proceeds associated to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Through financial transaction reports, FINTRAC is able to facilitate the detection, prevention and deterrence of all stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration) and the financing of terrorist activities by providing actionable financial intelligence disclosures to law enforcement and national security agencies.
Background

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling, although these crimes can overlap. Human smuggling involves individuals who voluntarily consent to be illegally moved across an international border by other individuals for an agreed-upon fee. Human smuggling always involves an international border, is consensual, and the relationship between the smuggler and smuggled person usually ends once the smuggled person arrives at their destination country. Conversely, human trafficking can occur both within a country’s own borders and through international movement, is not consensual (the trafficked person does not consent to being exploited), does not end upon crossing a border, and involves forcing or coercing the trafficked person to provide their services (typically through sexual exploitation or forced labour). In some cases, a smuggled person can become a victim of human trafficking when they arrive at their destination.

Project Protect
is a public-private partnership initiative led by the Bank of Montreal, supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC. First launched in 2016, Project Protect targets human trafficking for sexual exploitation by focusing on the money laundering aspect of the crime. The objective of the project is to improve the collective understanding of the crime, and to improve the detection of the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is reported to be more prevalent than forced labour. Canada is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit their victims primarily for financial gain. The money laundering indicators in this Operational Alert apply equally to victims trafficked in Canada regardless of their origin.

What is human trafficking?

“Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing,  harbouring, or exercising control, direction or influence over that person, for the purpose of exploitation, generally for sexual exploitation or forced labour.”
Public Safety Canada: “National strategy to combat human trafficking 2019-2024”

Research suggests that human trafficking for sexual exploitation, like drugs and weapons trafficking, is just another commodity in a range of criminal activities perpetrated mostly by organized crime groups who often collaborate with each other to maximize illicit financial gain. Sexual exploitation is a high-value business for criminals because, unlike a drug that can only be sold once, a human being can be sold repeatedly over an extended period of time. This type of crime is also attractive to criminals because the risk of losing business due to detection and successful prosecution is kept low through coercion of their victims in combination with the use of well-known money laundering methods. As a result, the perpetration of this crime is reinforced because criminals are able to benefit from the illicit proceeds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that global proceeds from human trafficking amount to USD 150 billion per year with USD 99 billion sourced specifically from forced sexual exploitation. 
In Canada, the number of police-reported incidents of human trafficking has been on an upward trend since 2011 with the highest number to date reported in 2019.Footnote 1 Yet, most cases of human trafficking are not reported to police due to the reluctance or inability of victims and witnesses to come forward. Footnote 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has not curtailed human trafficking in Canada and has caused many individuals to be more vulnerable to this crime.
A recent studyFootnote 3 by the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) found that exploitation through escort services distantly followed by illicit massage businesses were the most common forms of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Canada. Further, the CCEHT identified several human trafficking corridors in Canada connecting commercial sex markets within and across Canadian provinces.
Overview of FINTRAC’s analysis of disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitationFootnote *
FINTRAC analyzed a sample of approximately 100,000 transactions disclosed from 2018 to 2020 in FINTRAC disclosures related to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The majority of human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related FINTRAC disclosures primarily concerned victims providing sexual services at short-stay locations (e.g., hotels). Nearly all victims in FINTRAC’s sample were in this category. However, FINTRAC identified two other business models of where sexual exploitation occurred: exploitation at illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services (e.g., spas, massage parlours, private clubs), and at private residences (e.g., apartments) with some crossover between these three categories. All used advertisements of escort services to obtain clients and some traffickers operated their own escort agencies.
Overall, victims were nearly all females and 60% were under 25 years old at the time of their transactions and some were minors. Traffickers were mostly males aged between 24 and 36 years old. Female traffickers were mostly aged between 27 and 32 years old, albeit most were also victims and connected to male traffickers.
Traffickers who exploited their victims out of private residences or in illicit storefront businesses offering sexual services, however, were mostly older females (usually over 40 years old) and many operated with their spouses. Some traffickers in these categories also trafficked victims in short-stay locations and/or were associated to traffickers in those networks.
Overall, email money transfers and cash deposits were the primary transactions in human trafficking for sexual exploitation-related disclosures. Additionally, FINTRAC observed several money laundering methods in the disclosures. These included the use of online casinos, casinos, virtual currencies, prepaid credit cards, gift cards, nominees, front companies owned by traffickers or their associates, funds layered between related accounts, and investment accounts.
In addition to human trafficking, many traffickers were also involved in or suspected to be involved in other criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking, fraud) and were members or associates of criminal groups. Many traffickers used their victims to conduct other crimes. Therefore, the money laundering methods observed were likely also used to launder proceeds generated from other criminal activities and are not necessarily specific to human trafficking.
Traffickers frequently used nominees to funnel proceeds of crime, pay for human trafficking running costs, launder funds, or conceal beneficial ownership. These nominees were often victims and family members of traffickers. Victims were used as intermediaries to funnel funds to traffickers and other victims. Some victims had roles within human trafficking rings to collect funds from other victims. Some traffickers also had access to their victims’ accounts or held joint accounts with victims. The family members in FINTRAC’s sample were usually traffickers’ parents and spouses but also included their siblings, and adult and minor children.
Traffickers and victims often purchased virtual currencies with funds sent directly to virtual currency exchange businesses sometimes doing so immediately after receiving several email money transfers from third parties. However, several traffickers and victims also sent email money transfers to individuals who purchased virtual currencies on behalf of others. One such individual advertised their intermediary virtual currency services on escort websites.
Prepaid credit cards was another method traffickers and victims used to launder funds and to pay for human trafficking-running costs (e.g., escort ads, hotel bookings). Indeed, EUROPOL detected an increased use of prepaid credit cards among human trafficking organized crime groups for money laundering purposes.Footnote 4 FINTRAC also observed that some traffickers used prepaid credit cards as a means to provide funds to their victims. These traffickers transferred funds from their prepaid credit card to their victim’s prepaid credit card.
Traffickers and victims conducted transactions at casinos. In-person casino transactions were not observed beyond early 2020, highly likely a result of government restrictions imposed on businesses in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, FINTRAC observed a significant increase in transactions involving online casinos in 2019 and 2020 indicating that this is an upward trending money laundering method.

[Read More] […]

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Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

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Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile (PDF version, 314 kb)
Reference number: 2021-SIRA-001June 2021
In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) organizations to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Reporting entities should be aware of these new listings, as well as observed patterns in the financing behaviour of IMVE threat actors.Footnote 1
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) continues to support reporting entities by producing strategic intelligence products, which provide analytical perspectives on the nature, scope and threats posed by money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, this Special Bulletin presents the results of FINTRAC’s analysis of IMVE-related transaction reporting, supplemented by information from media reports and academic research.
Introduction
IMVE in Canada is driven by a range of grievances that transcend the traditional left–right ideological spectrum. IMVE is also distinct from religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has divided the violence carried out by threat actors associated with IMVE in Canada into four categories:

xenophobic violence: racially or ethnically motivated violence based on fear or hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, strange or different;
anti-authoritarian violence: violence against the authority of state and law-enforcement entities;
gender-driven violence: violence motivated by hatred of those with a different gender or sexual orientation; and
other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence: violence committed by individuals with no clear association with an organized group or any external guidance.

The terrorism threats posed by IMVE threat actors are on the rise around the world. According to a 2020 Trends Alert report published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks with links to extreme right-wing movements and ideologiesFootnote 3 over the last five years.
In 2019, Blood and Honour and its armed branch, Combat 18, were the first two IMVE-related organizations to be included on the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four IMVE organizations to this list: Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base and Russian Imperial Movement.
Violence in Canada that was motivated in whole or in part by IMVE has tended to take the form of spontaneous arsons, assaults and homicides. Targets include people of the Islamic and Jewish faiths, people of colour, women, Indigenous peoples and members of LGBTQ2 communities. Examples of recent IMVE attacks in Canada include the Quebec City mosque attack in 2017, the Toronto van attack in 2018 and the Toronto spa attack in 2020. This last instance saw, for the first time in Canada, terrorism charges brought against an individual associated with an IMVE ideology.
IMVE threat actors in Canada thrive online as the Internet allows these actors to connect anonymously across borders. IMVE threat actors in Canada use the Internet to make targeted calls for attacking equity-deserving groups offline, and to perpetuate racist and misogynistic tropes on social media that feed into broader narratives associated with conspiracy theories and anti-government movements.
Lone actors in the global IMVE context—those who, by themselves, carry out or attempt to carry out violent attacks in their home country or travel to possibly take part in violent activities elsewhere—raise their own funds, using their savings, employment income or money from family and friends.
Internationally, IMVE threat actors have raised funds through commercial activities, such as selling merchandise, holding events such as talks and concerts, crowdfunding, charging membership fees and accepting donations. IMVE threat actors have also been known to turn to drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and robberies to fund their operations. IMVE threat actors use the funds raised to recruit new members, engage in day-to-day activities and carry out promotional efforts such as making videos. In addition, the funds go toward organizing marches and events, maintaining websites, paying the legal fees of individuals arrested for their involvement in the IMVE movement, acquiring weapons and establishing safe houses.
In recent years, online crowdfunding platforms and social media sites have started to crack down on IMVE fundraising and promotional activities. This has led IMVE threat actors to seek alternative outlets. These tend to be smaller platforms than the mainstream ones, and they do not always have the resources to monitor and shut down IMVE activities. In response to increased restrictions on online platforms, IMVE threat actors have been encouraging their followers to send them money via mail, cheques or money orders. Following their de-platforming, IMVE threat actors have also increasingly turned to virtual currencies for fundraising. Threat actors mainly use virtual currency donations to fund their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The use of virtual currency has been associated with only one IMVE attack so far.
Observations in suspicious transaction reporting
FINTRAC observed a number of key patterns in IMVE threat actors when analyzing reporting that contained a reference to IMVE-related activity. Overwhelmingly, this data highlights general suspicions of terrorist activity financing and money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of drug-related crimes. The majority of IMVE-related financial transactions were concentrated in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.
Lone actors
The financial behaviour of lone IMVE actors is similar to that of lone actors in the RMVE space. Lone actors primarily used personal funds, such as those received from employment income or family members, to carry out attacks. There was no indication in the reporting that the family members were aware that the funds would be used for violent action.
As such, lone actors may be difficult to identify through transactions patterns or financial activity alone. Lone actors commonly used electronic money transfers to both send and receive funds, made cash withdrawals, and carried out regular debit and credit activity to send funds. Further, many lone actors were observed to have sent money transfers to unknown third parties. Lone actors were also observed using their own funds to buy weapons, either through online chain stores or in person. These individuals also carried out routine debit and credit account activity.
Cross-border networks
Individuals in Canada may fund international IMVE networks, while not necessarily being members of organized groups themselves. These individuals typically used payment processing companies and money services businesses to make international funds transfers. While these transactions tended to be small, recurring transfers to multiple nodes of the same international network in different countries, they totalled significant amounts. Financial support to IMVE threat actors also took the form of one-time donations.
Funds were typically sent to pay membership fees, purchase merchandise and gear, and to make general donations to IMVE threat actors overseas. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries forwarded the funds to recruiters for far-right militias and other similar groups. FINTRAC observed that Canadians were most often senders, not recipients, of funds.
Organized threat actors
Organized IMVE threat actors in Canada use both personal and business accounts to conduct their financial activities. Personal and business account transactions showed connections between IMVE threat actors, and individuals and companies charged with crimes such as fraud, robbery, assaulting police officers, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.
Using personal accounts, IMVE threat actors largely relied on electronic money transfers and cash deposits for their fundraising activities. These transfers typically involved small amounts. The majority of funds were suspected to be used to buy firearms and gear, as well as for donations and membership fees. FINTRAC observed several IMVE-related payments to personal accounts from crowdfunding sites.
FINTRAC is aware of the growing use of virtual currencies by IMVE threat actors to send and receive funds. However, the individuals conducting transactions with someone in the network of IMVE threat actors were not always an IMVE threat actor themselves.
The continued use of business accounts by IMVE-related actors could enable groups to raise larger amounts of funds under the guise of legitimate business transactions. This is because business transactions are generally larger than those involving personal accounts and can be conducted without raising much suspicion.
Characteristics in the financing of IMVE activity
The broad characteristics of IMVE found in suspicious transaction reports and set out below may not necessarily be indicative of terrorist financing. Consequently, reporting entities must examine them in conjunction with additional risk indicators such as transactions with links to IMVE threat actors listed as terrorist entities or adverse media reporting.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

You are here:

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile (PDF version, 314 kb)
Reference number: 2021-SIRA-001June 2021
In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) organizations to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Reporting entities should be aware of these new listings, as well as observed patterns in the financing behaviour of IMVE threat actors.Footnote 1
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) continues to support reporting entities by producing strategic intelligence products, which provide analytical perspectives on the nature, scope and threats posed by money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, this Special Bulletin presents the results of FINTRAC’s analysis of IMVE-related transaction reporting, supplemented by information from media reports and academic research.
Introduction
IMVE in Canada is driven by a range of grievances that transcend the traditional left–right ideological spectrum. IMVE is also distinct from religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has divided the violence carried out by threat actors associated with IMVE in Canada into four categories:

xenophobic violence: racially or ethnically motivated violence based on fear or hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, strange or different;
anti-authoritarian violence: violence against the authority of state and law-enforcement entities;
gender-driven violence: violence motivated by hatred of those with a different gender or sexual orientation; and
other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence: violence committed by individuals with no clear association with an organized group or any external guidance.

The terrorism threats posed by IMVE threat actors are on the rise around the world. According to a 2020 Trends Alert report published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks with links to extreme right-wing movements and ideologiesFootnote 3 over the last five years.
In 2019, Blood and Honour and its armed branch, Combat 18, were the first two IMVE-related organizations to be included on the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four IMVE organizations to this list: Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base and Russian Imperial Movement.
Violence in Canada that was motivated in whole or in part by IMVE has tended to take the form of spontaneous arsons, assaults and homicides. Targets include people of the Islamic and Jewish faiths, people of colour, women, Indigenous peoples and members of LGBTQ2 communities. Examples of recent IMVE attacks in Canada include the Quebec City mosque attack in 2017, the Toronto van attack in 2018 and the Toronto spa attack in 2020. This last instance saw, for the first time in Canada, terrorism charges brought against an individual associated with an IMVE ideology.
IMVE threat actors in Canada thrive online as the Internet allows these actors to connect anonymously across borders. IMVE threat actors in Canada use the Internet to make targeted calls for attacking equity-deserving groups offline, and to perpetuate racist and misogynistic tropes on social media that feed into broader narratives associated with conspiracy theories and anti-government movements.
Lone actors in the global IMVE context—those who, by themselves, carry out or attempt to carry out violent attacks in their home country or travel to possibly take part in violent activities elsewhere—raise their own funds, using their savings, employment income or money from family and friends.
Internationally, IMVE threat actors have raised funds through commercial activities, such as selling merchandise, holding events such as talks and concerts, crowdfunding, charging membership fees and accepting donations. IMVE threat actors have also been known to turn to drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and robberies to fund their operations. IMVE threat actors use the funds raised to recruit new members, engage in day-to-day activities and carry out promotional efforts such as making videos. In addition, the funds go toward organizing marches and events, maintaining websites, paying the legal fees of individuals arrested for their involvement in the IMVE movement, acquiring weapons and establishing safe houses.
In recent years, online crowdfunding platforms and social media sites have started to crack down on IMVE fundraising and promotional activities. This has led IMVE threat actors to seek alternative outlets. These tend to be smaller platforms than the mainstream ones, and they do not always have the resources to monitor and shut down IMVE activities. In response to increased restrictions on online platforms, IMVE threat actors have been encouraging their followers to send them money via mail, cheques or money orders. Following their de-platforming, IMVE threat actors have also increasingly turned to virtual currencies for fundraising. Threat actors mainly use virtual currency donations to fund their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The use of virtual currency has been associated with only one IMVE attack so far.
Observations in suspicious transaction reporting
FINTRAC observed a number of key patterns in IMVE threat actors when analyzing reporting that contained a reference to IMVE-related activity. Overwhelmingly, this data highlights general suspicions of terrorist activity financing and money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of drug-related crimes. The majority of IMVE-related financial transactions were concentrated in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.
Lone actors
The financial behaviour of lone IMVE actors is similar to that of lone actors in the RMVE space. Lone actors primarily used personal funds, such as those received from employment income or family members, to carry out attacks. There was no indication in the reporting that the family members were aware that the funds would be used for violent action.
As such, lone actors may be difficult to identify through transactions patterns or financial activity alone. Lone actors commonly used electronic money transfers to both send and receive funds, made cash withdrawals, and carried out regular debit and credit activity to send funds. Further, many lone actors were observed to have sent money transfers to unknown third parties. Lone actors were also observed using their own funds to buy weapons, either through online chain stores or in person. These individuals also carried out routine debit and credit account activity.
Cross-border networks
Individuals in Canada may fund international IMVE networks, while not necessarily being members of organized groups themselves. These individuals typically used payment processing companies and money services businesses to make international funds transfers. While these transactions tended to be small, recurring transfers to multiple nodes of the same international network in different countries, they totalled significant amounts. Financial support to IMVE threat actors also took the form of one-time donations.
Funds were typically sent to pay membership fees, purchase merchandise and gear, and to make general donations to IMVE threat actors overseas. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries forwarded the funds to recruiters for far-right militias and other similar groups. FINTRAC observed that Canadians were most often senders, not recipients, of funds.
Organized threat actors
Organized IMVE threat actors in Canada use both personal and business accounts to conduct their financial activities. Personal and business account transactions showed connections between IMVE threat actors, and individuals and companies charged with crimes such as fraud, robbery, assaulting police officers, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.
Using personal accounts, IMVE threat actors largely relied on electronic money transfers and cash deposits for their fundraising activities. These transfers typically involved small amounts. The majority of funds were suspected to be used to buy firearms and gear, as well as for donations and membership fees. FINTRAC observed several IMVE-related payments to personal accounts from crowdfunding sites.
FINTRAC is aware of the growing use of virtual currencies by IMVE threat actors to send and receive funds. However, the individuals conducting transactions with someone in the network of IMVE threat actors were not always an IMVE threat actor themselves.
The continued use of business accounts by IMVE-related actors could enable groups to raise larger amounts of funds under the guise of legitimate business transactions. This is because business transactions are generally larger than those involving personal accounts and can be conducted without raising much suspicion.
Characteristics in the financing of IMVE activity
The broad characteristics of IMVE found in suspicious transaction reports and set out below may not necessarily be indicative of terrorist financing. Consequently, reporting entities must examine them in conjunction with additional risk indicators such as transactions with links to IMVE threat actors listed as terrorist entities or adverse media reporting.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

You are here:

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile (PDF version, 314 kb)
Reference number: 2021-SIRA-001June 2021
In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) organizations to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Reporting entities should be aware of these new listings, as well as observed patterns in the financing behaviour of IMVE threat actors.Footnote 1
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) continues to support reporting entities by producing strategic intelligence products, which provide analytical perspectives on the nature, scope and threats posed by money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, this Special Bulletin presents the results of FINTRAC’s analysis of IMVE-related transaction reporting, supplemented by information from media reports and academic research.
Introduction
IMVE in Canada is driven by a range of grievances that transcend the traditional left–right ideological spectrum. IMVE is also distinct from religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has divided the violence carried out by threat actors associated with IMVE in Canada into four categories:

xenophobic violence: racially or ethnically motivated violence based on fear or hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, strange or different;
anti-authoritarian violence: violence against the authority of state and law-enforcement entities;
gender-driven violence: violence motivated by hatred of those with a different gender or sexual orientation; and
other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence: violence committed by individuals with no clear association with an organized group or any external guidance.

The terrorism threats posed by IMVE threat actors are on the rise around the world. According to a 2020 Trends Alert report published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks with links to extreme right-wing movements and ideologiesFootnote 3 over the last five years.
In 2019, Blood and Honour and its armed branch, Combat 18, were the first two IMVE-related organizations to be included on the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four IMVE organizations to this list: Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base and Russian Imperial Movement.
Violence in Canada that was motivated in whole or in part by IMVE has tended to take the form of spontaneous arsons, assaults and homicides. Targets include people of the Islamic and Jewish faiths, people of colour, women, Indigenous peoples and members of LGBTQ2 communities. Examples of recent IMVE attacks in Canada include the Quebec City mosque attack in 2017, the Toronto van attack in 2018 and the Toronto spa attack in 2020. This last instance saw, for the first time in Canada, terrorism charges brought against an individual associated with an IMVE ideology.
IMVE threat actors in Canada thrive online as the Internet allows these actors to connect anonymously across borders. IMVE threat actors in Canada use the Internet to make targeted calls for attacking equity-deserving groups offline, and to perpetuate racist and misogynistic tropes on social media that feed into broader narratives associated with conspiracy theories and anti-government movements.
Lone actors in the global IMVE context—those who, by themselves, carry out or attempt to carry out violent attacks in their home country or travel to possibly take part in violent activities elsewhere—raise their own funds, using their savings, employment income or money from family and friends.
Internationally, IMVE threat actors have raised funds through commercial activities, such as selling merchandise, holding events such as talks and concerts, crowdfunding, charging membership fees and accepting donations. IMVE threat actors have also been known to turn to drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and robberies to fund their operations. IMVE threat actors use the funds raised to recruit new members, engage in day-to-day activities and carry out promotional efforts such as making videos. In addition, the funds go toward organizing marches and events, maintaining websites, paying the legal fees of individuals arrested for their involvement in the IMVE movement, acquiring weapons and establishing safe houses.
In recent years, online crowdfunding platforms and social media sites have started to crack down on IMVE fundraising and promotional activities. This has led IMVE threat actors to seek alternative outlets. These tend to be smaller platforms than the mainstream ones, and they do not always have the resources to monitor and shut down IMVE activities. In response to increased restrictions on online platforms, IMVE threat actors have been encouraging their followers to send them money via mail, cheques or money orders. Following their de-platforming, IMVE threat actors have also increasingly turned to virtual currencies for fundraising. Threat actors mainly use virtual currency donations to fund their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The use of virtual currency has been associated with only one IMVE attack so far.
Observations in suspicious transaction reporting
FINTRAC observed a number of key patterns in IMVE threat actors when analyzing reporting that contained a reference to IMVE-related activity. Overwhelmingly, this data highlights general suspicions of terrorist activity financing and money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of drug-related crimes. The majority of IMVE-related financial transactions were concentrated in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.
Lone actors
The financial behaviour of lone IMVE actors is similar to that of lone actors in the RMVE space. Lone actors primarily used personal funds, such as those received from employment income or family members, to carry out attacks. There was no indication in the reporting that the family members were aware that the funds would be used for violent action.
As such, lone actors may be difficult to identify through transactions patterns or financial activity alone. Lone actors commonly used electronic money transfers to both send and receive funds, made cash withdrawals, and carried out regular debit and credit activity to send funds. Further, many lone actors were observed to have sent money transfers to unknown third parties. Lone actors were also observed using their own funds to buy weapons, either through online chain stores or in person. These individuals also carried out routine debit and credit account activity.
Cross-border networks
Individuals in Canada may fund international IMVE networks, while not necessarily being members of organized groups themselves. These individuals typically used payment processing companies and money services businesses to make international funds transfers. While these transactions tended to be small, recurring transfers to multiple nodes of the same international network in different countries, they totalled significant amounts. Financial support to IMVE threat actors also took the form of one-time donations.
Funds were typically sent to pay membership fees, purchase merchandise and gear, and to make general donations to IMVE threat actors overseas. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries forwarded the funds to recruiters for far-right militias and other similar groups. FINTRAC observed that Canadians were most often senders, not recipients, of funds.
Organized threat actors
Organized IMVE threat actors in Canada use both personal and business accounts to conduct their financial activities. Personal and business account transactions showed connections between IMVE threat actors, and individuals and companies charged with crimes such as fraud, robbery, assaulting police officers, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.
Using personal accounts, IMVE threat actors largely relied on electronic money transfers and cash deposits for their fundraising activities. These transfers typically involved small amounts. The majority of funds were suspected to be used to buy firearms and gear, as well as for donations and membership fees. FINTRAC observed several IMVE-related payments to personal accounts from crowdfunding sites.
FINTRAC is aware of the growing use of virtual currencies by IMVE threat actors to send and receive funds. However, the individuals conducting transactions with someone in the network of IMVE threat actors were not always an IMVE threat actor themselves.
The continued use of business accounts by IMVE-related actors could enable groups to raise larger amounts of funds under the guise of legitimate business transactions. This is because business transactions are generally larger than those involving personal accounts and can be conducted without raising much suspicion.
Characteristics in the financing of IMVE activity
The broad characteristics of IMVE found in suspicious transaction reports and set out below may not necessarily be indicative of terrorist financing. Consequently, reporting entities must examine them in conjunction with additional risk indicators such as transactions with links to IMVE threat actors listed as terrorist entities or adverse media reporting.

[Read More] […]

Read More…

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

You are here:

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile (PDF version, 314 kb)
Reference number: 2021-SIRA-001June 2021
In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) organizations to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Reporting entities should be aware of these new listings, as well as observed patterns in the financing behaviour of IMVE threat actors.Footnote 1
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) continues to support reporting entities by producing strategic intelligence products, which provide analytical perspectives on the nature, scope and threats posed by money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, this Special Bulletin presents the results of FINTRAC’s analysis of IMVE-related transaction reporting, supplemented by information from media reports and academic research.
Introduction
IMVE in Canada is driven by a range of grievances that transcend the traditional left–right ideological spectrum. IMVE is also distinct from religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has divided the violence carried out by threat actors associated with IMVE in Canada into four categories:

xenophobic violence: racially or ethnically motivated violence based on fear or hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, strange or different;
anti-authoritarian violence: violence against the authority of state and law-enforcement entities;
gender-driven violence: violence motivated by hatred of those with a different gender or sexual orientation; and
other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence: violence committed by individuals with no clear association with an organized group or any external guidance.

The terrorism threats posed by IMVE threat actors are on the rise around the world. According to a 2020 Trends Alert report published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks with links to extreme right-wing movements and ideologiesFootnote 3 over the last five years.
In 2019, Blood and Honour and its armed branch, Combat 18, were the first two IMVE-related organizations to be included on the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four IMVE organizations to this list: Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base and Russian Imperial Movement.
Violence in Canada that was motivated in whole or in part by IMVE has tended to take the form of spontaneous arsons, assaults and homicides. Targets include people of the Islamic and Jewish faiths, people of colour, women, Indigenous peoples and members of LGBTQ2 communities. Examples of recent IMVE attacks in Canada include the Quebec City mosque attack in 2017, the Toronto van attack in 2018 and the Toronto spa attack in 2020. This last instance saw, for the first time in Canada, terrorism charges brought against an individual associated with an IMVE ideology.
IMVE threat actors in Canada thrive online as the Internet allows these actors to connect anonymously across borders. IMVE threat actors in Canada use the Internet to make targeted calls for attacking equity-deserving groups offline, and to perpetuate racist and misogynistic tropes on social media that feed into broader narratives associated with conspiracy theories and anti-government movements.
Lone actors in the global IMVE context—those who, by themselves, carry out or attempt to carry out violent attacks in their home country or travel to possibly take part in violent activities elsewhere—raise their own funds, using their savings, employment income or money from family and friends.
Internationally, IMVE threat actors have raised funds through commercial activities, such as selling merchandise, holding events such as talks and concerts, crowdfunding, charging membership fees and accepting donations. IMVE threat actors have also been known to turn to drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and robberies to fund their operations. IMVE threat actors use the funds raised to recruit new members, engage in day-to-day activities and carry out promotional efforts such as making videos. In addition, the funds go toward organizing marches and events, maintaining websites, paying the legal fees of individuals arrested for their involvement in the IMVE movement, acquiring weapons and establishing safe houses.
In recent years, online crowdfunding platforms and social media sites have started to crack down on IMVE fundraising and promotional activities. This has led IMVE threat actors to seek alternative outlets. These tend to be smaller platforms than the mainstream ones, and they do not always have the resources to monitor and shut down IMVE activities. In response to increased restrictions on online platforms, IMVE threat actors have been encouraging their followers to send them money via mail, cheques or money orders. Following their de-platforming, IMVE threat actors have also increasingly turned to virtual currencies for fundraising. Threat actors mainly use virtual currency donations to fund their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The use of virtual currency has been associated with only one IMVE attack so far.
Observations in suspicious transaction reporting
FINTRAC observed a number of key patterns in IMVE threat actors when analyzing reporting that contained a reference to IMVE-related activity. Overwhelmingly, this data highlights general suspicions of terrorist activity financing and money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of drug-related crimes. The majority of IMVE-related financial transactions were concentrated in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.
Lone actors
The financial behaviour of lone IMVE actors is similar to that of lone actors in the RMVE space. Lone actors primarily used personal funds, such as those received from employment income or family members, to carry out attacks. There was no indication in the reporting that the family members were aware that the funds would be used for violent action.
As such, lone actors may be difficult to identify through transactions patterns or financial activity alone. Lone actors commonly used electronic money transfers to both send and receive funds, made cash withdrawals, and carried out regular debit and credit activity to send funds. Further, many lone actors were observed to have sent money transfers to unknown third parties. Lone actors were also observed using their own funds to buy weapons, either through online chain stores or in person. These individuals also carried out routine debit and credit account activity.
Cross-border networks
Individuals in Canada may fund international IMVE networks, while not necessarily being members of organized groups themselves. These individuals typically used payment processing companies and money services businesses to make international funds transfers. While these transactions tended to be small, recurring transfers to multiple nodes of the same international network in different countries, they totalled significant amounts. Financial support to IMVE threat actors also took the form of one-time donations.
Funds were typically sent to pay membership fees, purchase merchandise and gear, and to make general donations to IMVE threat actors overseas. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries forwarded the funds to recruiters for far-right militias and other similar groups. FINTRAC observed that Canadians were most often senders, not recipients, of funds.
Organized threat actors
Organized IMVE threat actors in Canada use both personal and business accounts to conduct their financial activities. Personal and business account transactions showed connections between IMVE threat actors, and individuals and companies charged with crimes such as fraud, robbery, assaulting police officers, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.
Using personal accounts, IMVE threat actors largely relied on electronic money transfers and cash deposits for their fundraising activities. These transfers typically involved small amounts. The majority of funds were suspected to be used to buy firearms and gear, as well as for donations and membership fees. FINTRAC observed several IMVE-related payments to personal accounts from crowdfunding sites.
FINTRAC is aware of the growing use of virtual currencies by IMVE threat actors to send and receive funds. However, the individuals conducting transactions with someone in the network of IMVE threat actors were not always an IMVE threat actor themselves.
The continued use of business accounts by IMVE-related actors could enable groups to raise larger amounts of funds under the guise of legitimate business transactions. This is because business transactions are generally larger than those involving personal accounts and can be conducted without raising much suspicion.
Characteristics in the financing of IMVE activity
The broad characteristics of IMVE found in suspicious transaction reports and set out below may not necessarily be indicative of terrorist financing. Consequently, reporting entities must examine them in conjunction with additional risk indicators such as transactions with links to IMVE threat actors listed as terrorist entities or adverse media reporting.

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Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile

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Special Bulletin on Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Terrorist Activity Financing Profile (PDF version, 314 kb)
Reference number: 2021-SIRA-001June 2021
In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) organizations to the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Reporting entities should be aware of these new listings, as well as observed patterns in the financing behaviour of IMVE threat actors.Footnote 1
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) continues to support reporting entities by producing strategic intelligence products, which provide analytical perspectives on the nature, scope and threats posed by money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, this Special Bulletin presents the results of FINTRAC’s analysis of IMVE-related transaction reporting, supplemented by information from media reports and academic research.
Introduction
IMVE in Canada is driven by a range of grievances that transcend the traditional left–right ideological spectrum. IMVE is also distinct from religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has divided the violence carried out by threat actors associated with IMVE in Canada into four categories:

xenophobic violence: racially or ethnically motivated violence based on fear or hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, strange or different;
anti-authoritarian violence: violence against the authority of state and law-enforcement entities;
gender-driven violence: violence motivated by hatred of those with a different gender or sexual orientation; and
other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence: violence committed by individuals with no clear association with an organized group or any external guidance.

The terrorism threats posed by IMVE threat actors are on the rise around the world. According to a 2020 Trends Alert report published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks with links to extreme right-wing movements and ideologiesFootnote 3 over the last five years.
In 2019, Blood and Honour and its armed branch, Combat 18, were the first two IMVE-related organizations to be included on the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. In February 2021, the Government of Canada added four IMVE organizations to this list: Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base and Russian Imperial Movement.
Violence in Canada that was motivated in whole or in part by IMVE has tended to take the form of spontaneous arsons, assaults and homicides. Targets include people of the Islamic and Jewish faiths, people of colour, women, Indigenous peoples and members of LGBTQ2 communities. Examples of recent IMVE attacks in Canada include the Quebec City mosque attack in 2017, the Toronto van attack in 2018 and the Toronto spa attack in 2020. This last instance saw, for the first time in Canada, terrorism charges brought against an individual associated with an IMVE ideology.
IMVE threat actors in Canada thrive online as the Internet allows these actors to connect anonymously across borders. IMVE threat actors in Canada use the Internet to make targeted calls for attacking equity-deserving groups offline, and to perpetuate racist and misogynistic tropes on social media that feed into broader narratives associated with conspiracy theories and anti-government movements.
Lone actors in the global IMVE context—those who, by themselves, carry out or attempt to carry out violent attacks in their home country or travel to possibly take part in violent activities elsewhere—raise their own funds, using their savings, employment income or money from family and friends.
Internationally, IMVE threat actors have raised funds through commercial activities, such as selling merchandise, holding events such as talks and concerts, crowdfunding, charging membership fees and accepting donations. IMVE threat actors have also been known to turn to drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and robberies to fund their operations. IMVE threat actors use the funds raised to recruit new members, engage in day-to-day activities and carry out promotional efforts such as making videos. In addition, the funds go toward organizing marches and events, maintaining websites, paying the legal fees of individuals arrested for their involvement in the IMVE movement, acquiring weapons and establishing safe houses.
In recent years, online crowdfunding platforms and social media sites have started to crack down on IMVE fundraising and promotional activities. This has led IMVE threat actors to seek alternative outlets. These tend to be smaller platforms than the mainstream ones, and they do not always have the resources to monitor and shut down IMVE activities. In response to increased restrictions on online platforms, IMVE threat actors have been encouraging their followers to send them money via mail, cheques or money orders. Following their de-platforming, IMVE threat actors have also increasingly turned to virtual currencies for fundraising. Threat actors mainly use virtual currency donations to fund their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The use of virtual currency has been associated with only one IMVE attack so far.
Observations in suspicious transaction reporting
FINTRAC observed a number of key patterns in IMVE threat actors when analyzing reporting that contained a reference to IMVE-related activity. Overwhelmingly, this data highlights general suspicions of terrorist activity financing and money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of drug-related crimes. The majority of IMVE-related financial transactions were concentrated in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario.
Lone actors
The financial behaviour of lone IMVE actors is similar to that of lone actors in the RMVE space. Lone actors primarily used personal funds, such as those received from employment income or family members, to carry out attacks. There was no indication in the reporting that the family members were aware that the funds would be used for violent action.
As such, lone actors may be difficult to identify through transactions patterns or financial activity alone. Lone actors commonly used electronic money transfers to both send and receive funds, made cash withdrawals, and carried out regular debit and credit activity to send funds. Further, many lone actors were observed to have sent money transfers to unknown third parties. Lone actors were also observed using their own funds to buy weapons, either through online chain stores or in person. These individuals also carried out routine debit and credit account activity.
Cross-border networks
Individuals in Canada may fund international IMVE networks, while not necessarily being members of organized groups themselves. These individuals typically used payment processing companies and money services businesses to make international funds transfers. While these transactions tended to be small, recurring transfers to multiple nodes of the same international network in different countries, they totalled significant amounts. Financial support to IMVE threat actors also took the form of one-time donations.
Funds were typically sent to pay membership fees, purchase merchandise and gear, and to make general donations to IMVE threat actors overseas. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries forwarded the funds to recruiters for far-right militias and other similar groups. FINTRAC observed that Canadians were most often senders, not recipients, of funds.
Organized threat actors
Organized IMVE threat actors in Canada use both personal and business accounts to conduct their financial activities. Personal and business account transactions showed connections between IMVE threat actors, and individuals and companies charged with crimes such as fraud, robbery, assaulting police officers, drug trafficking and weapons offenses.
Using personal accounts, IMVE threat actors largely relied on electronic money transfers and cash deposits for their fundraising activities. These transfers typically involved small amounts. The majority of funds were suspected to be used to buy firearms and gear, as well as for donations and membership fees. FINTRAC observed several IMVE-related payments to personal accounts from crowdfunding sites.
FINTRAC is aware of the growing use of virtual currencies by IMVE threat actors to send and receive funds. However, the individuals conducting transactions with someone in the network of IMVE threat actors were not always an IMVE threat actor themselves.
The continued use of business accounts by IMVE-related actors could enable groups to raise larger amounts of funds under the guise of legitimate business transactions. This is because business transactions are generally larger than those involving personal accounts and can be conducted without raising much suspicion.
Characteristics in the financing of IMVE activity
The broad characteristics of IMVE found in suspicious transaction reports and set out below may not necessarily be indicative of terrorist financing. Consequently, reporting entities must examine them in conjunction with additional risk indicators such as transactions with links to IMVE threat actors listed as terrorist entities or adverse media reporting.

[Read More] […]

Read More…